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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
DISPUTES IN TAIWAN 
Ya-Ling Wu† 
Abstract: The issue of whether or not no-fault liability under the Consumer 
Protection Law (“CPL”) applies in medical malpractice disputes has been a contentious 
battle in Taiwan.  In Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Memorial Hospital, the Taipei District Court 
interpreted medical care as “services” under Article 7 of the CPL.  Under this 
interpretation, patient services must meet “reasonably expected safety standards,” while 
health care providers are subject to no-fault liability.  This interpretation was strenuously 
opposed by the medical profession and invoked much debate over its validity in the legal 
field.  After the Bo-Li case, the lower courts expressed different views on this issue.  The 
Taiwan Supreme Court was also silent for seven years until recent decisions where the 
Court refused to apply the CPL to medical malpractice.  Despite this, it is still unclear 
whether the interpretation will be codified, as the Legislature was reluctant to exclude 
medical care from the reach of consumer protection.  The Bo-Li case reveals current 
policy and practicability concerns in Taiwan.  Under the current scheme, it is difficult to 
prove the culpability of doctors in medical injury cases.  Thus, no-fault liability under the 
CPL may serve as an alternative avenue to compensate victims.  However, Taiwan does 
not have an insurance network and social welfare system that is favorable to this 
possibility.  Under the current arrangement in Taiwan, instituting no-fault liability would 
eventually force health care providers to practice defensive medicine.  Weighing all these 
factors, this Comment proposes that no-fault medical liability is currently impractical.  
Instead, Taiwan should aim to resolve issues under the current scheme to improve the 
litigation process, strengthen the duty of informed consent, and increase the use of 
malpractice insurance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Medical malpractice law in Taiwan has a relatively short history 
compared to the U.S.1  It was developed in the early 1990s with the 
institutionalization of a centralized National Health Insurance Program 
(“NHIP”).2  Under Taiwanese law, the legal basis for medical malpractice 
lawsuits derives from criminal liability,3 breach of contract, or tortious 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Prof. Veronica Taylor, Judge Fu-Lang Lin, Shinrou Lin, Clark Lin 
and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their help in the development of this Comment.  
For consistency, the Wade-Giles system is used for romanization throughout this comment. 
1
 HSIU-I YANG, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN TAIWAN: MYTH AND REALITY 1 (J.S.D. dissertation, 
Stanford University, 1997). 
2
 Id. 
3
 See Chung hua ming kuo hsing fa [Criminal Code] (Taiwan) arts. 276, 284 [hereinafter Criminal 
Code] (a person who negligently causes bodily injury or death to others shall be punished). 
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liability.4  The burden of proof for a tort-based claim is on a plaintiff to 
prove standard of care, breach of the standard (negligence), causation, and 
damages.5  However, the burden of proof in a medical negligence case 
presents several problems.6  A patient seldom has the information necessary 
to bring a claim.7  The need for expert testimony also poses an obstacle for 
patients.8  In Taiwan, plaintiffs do not have the discretion to introduce 
medical experts or evidence at trial.  Instead, the judge has the sole authority 
to determine which experts will be called.9  A court typically employs the 
Medical Review Committee (“MRC”) under Department of Health, the 
Executive Yuan,10 which reviews medical records and offers expert opinions 
on the medical standard of care.11 
The MRC is an administrative agency operated by the Bureau of 
Medical Affairs (“BMA”) under the Medical Care Act of 1986.12  Prior to 
1987, courts and other judicial organizations routinely consulted with the 
Medical Dispute Reviewing Committee (“MDRC”) formed by the Taiwan 
Physician’s Association.13  Because the MDRC was composed entirely of 
physicians,14 the public questioned its neutrality.  In response to this concern, 
the Executive Yuan Department of Health founded the MRC in 1987 as the 
first official medical review board.15  The MRC consists of physicians, 
lawyers, scholars, and social personages.16  In addition to providing expert 
opinions for the judiciary, the MRC also handles various matters such as 
reviewing new medical technologies and discussing reform agendas.17  The 
MRC has been known to favor defendants, such as medical institutions and 
                                           
4
 See Ming fa [Civil Code] (Taiwan) art. 184 [hereinafter Civil Code] (a person who intentionally or 
negligently violates the right of another is liable to make compensation for the damage resulting 
therefrom). 
5
 YANG, supra note 1, at 41. 
6
 Id. at 50. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. at 52. 
9
 Id. at 52-3. 
10
 See Department of Health, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan), Hsing cheng yuen wei sheng shu I 
shih shen I wei yuen hui tsu chih kui ch'eng [Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Medical Review 
Committee Organization Regulation], available at https://wiki.blinkenarea.org/bin/mini?u=2l (last visited 
May 5, 2007). 
11
 YANG, supra note 1, at 55-6. 
12
 I liao fa, [Medical Care Act] ch. VIII (Taiwan) [hereinafter Medical Care Act]. 
13
 YANG, supra note 1, at 54. 
14
 Id. at 55-6. 
15
 Id. 
16
 See id. art. 100 (providing that “[m]embers of the medical review committee referred to in the 
preceding two Articles shall include medical experts, legal experts, scholars, and social personages, 
excluding legislators/councilors and representatives of medical juridical persons, of which legal experts and 
social personages shall account for at least one-third of the number of members”). 
17
 See Department of Health, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan), supra note 10. 
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physicians.18  In addition to this impediment, the complexity and cost of 
litigation deter and even prevent victims of medical malpractice from 
seeking legal remedies.  
Because it is difficult to prove negligence under the conventional 
scheme, plaintiffs often seek other avenues to recover losses from medical 
injuries, such as the no-fault compensation scheme under the CPL.19  The 
CPL was enacted in 1994.  The underlying legislative purpose was to protect 
consumers, traditionally the weaker parties, from the abuses of business 
operators.20  The CPL forces business operators to comply with the 
reasonably expected standard, which is detailed in the Enforcement Rules of 
the CPL.21  Subsequent to the passage of the CPL, there was and is still 
much disagreement over the definitions of “service,” “consumer,” and 
“business operator” in its statutory language.22 
For the first time in Taiwan, the Taipei District Court adopted a no-
fault medical liability rule under the CPL in Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Memorial 
Hospital.23  This case signaled a potential change in patients’ right to seek 
remedies in medical malpractice disputes.  However, this case also triggered 
debates over whether medical personnel should be subject to no-fault 
liability. 
This Comment addresses several subjects arising out of this issue.  
Part II provides a summary of the Bo-Li case.  Part III examines in depth the 
Bo-Li court’s interpretation of the CPL’s scope.  Part IV discusses the issues 
related to the burden of proof in a medical malpractice case.  Part V analyzes 
other judiciary holdings, including the recent Taiwan Supreme Court’s 
opinion, as well as the Legislature’s position.  Finally, this Comment 
addresses the practicality of applying no-fault liability to medical injury 
lawsuits and suggests future directions in Part VI and VII.  This Comment 
                                           
18
 See infra Part IV. 
19
 Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa [Consumer Protection Law] (Taiwan) [hereinafter CPL], available at 
http://www.cpc.gov.tw/en/index.asp?pagenumber=638 (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).  No-fault liability applies 
both to goods and services under the CPL.  The essence of no-fault liability is similar to implied warranty 
of merchantability and strict liability in the U.S. law.   
20
 See id., art. 1. 
21
 Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa shih hsing his tse [Enforcement Rules of the CPL] art. 5 (Taiwan) 
[hereinafter Enforcement Rules].  Enforcement Rules of the CPL supplements the CPL.  Article 5 of the 
Enforcement Rules provides that “‘[d]anger to safety or sanitation’ as mentioned in Paragraph 1, Article 7 
of the Law shall be present if the goods, when circulated into the market, or the services, when provided, 
lack the generally and reasonably anticipated safety, except where such goods or services are up to the then 
scientific and technical or professional standards.” 
22
 See infra Part V.  
23
 Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Mem’l Hosp., 1998 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct., Jan. 2, 1998) (85 
Docket No. SU 5125) [hereinafter Bo-Li]. 
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also translates the reasoning of the original court opinion and addresses the 
debate over whether medical care is under the scope of the CPL. 
II. CASE SUMMARY OF BO-LI LI V. MACKAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
The seminal case applying the CPL in the medical context was a birth 
injury lawsuit decided in 1998.24  The plaintiff, Bo-Li Li, was born at 
Mackay Memorial Hospital on December 5th, 1994.  Before Li’s birth, his 
mother Tan had regular prenatal check-ups at Mackay Memorial Hospital by 
Dr. Cheng-Chieh Cheng.  Over the course of Tan’s labor, an emergency 
situation called shoulder dystocia occurred.  Shoulder dystocia occurs when 
the fetal head has been delivered but the shoulders are stuck and cannot be 
delivered.25  In response to the medical condition, Dr. Cheng performed a 
procedure called the “McRoberts maneuver” to assist with Tan’s labor.  Soon 
after Li was born, his parents discovered that Li’s right forearm was 
paralyzed due to brachial plexus injuries that are generally associated with 
shoulder dystocia.26  Even though Li received further surgery and physical 
reconstruction, his injured arm was still unable to achieve normal function.  
As a result of his injury, his right arm could only move 130 degrees, instead 
of the normal range of 180 degrees.27  His medical condition was confirmed 
by the MRC and was not disputed by either party.28 
Shoulder dystocia is considered an unpredictable emergency.  
However, maternal obesity, diabetes, and fetal macrosomia are prenatal 
factors associated with the incidence of shoulder dystocia.29  The plaintiff 
Bo-Li Li brought a tortious claim against the defendant, the Mackay 
Memorial Hospital, for the malpractice of its employee, Dr. Cheng-Chieh 
Cheng.30  The plaintiff also contended that the defendant was liable under 
Article 7 of the CPL for failing to provide necessary services to ensure Li’s 
safety, despite several indications of risk over the course of Tan’s 
                                           
24
 Id. 
25
 Robert B. Gherman, et al., Shoulder Dystocia: The Unpreventable Obstetric Emergency with 
Empiric Management Guidelines, 195(3) AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 657, 658 (2006). 
26
 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Erb-Duchenne and Dejerine-
Klumpke Palsies Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/brachial_plexus_birth/brachial_plexus_birth.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 
2007) (The brachial plexus is a network of nerves that conducts signals from the spine to the shoulder, arm, 
and hand.  Brachial plexus injuries are caused by damage to those nerves). 
27
 See Bo-Li, supra note 23. 
28
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
29
 Gherman, et al., supra note 25, at 659.  The term “fetal macrosomia” is used to describe a 
newborn infant with an excessive birth weight. 
30
 See Bo-Li, supra note 23.  Dr. Cheng was sued in a separate case for occupational negligence and 
was found not liable both by the Taipei District Court (84 Docket No. Tzu 427) and Taiwan High Court (85 
Docket No. SHANG-I 2132). 
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pregnancy.31  First, Tan was considered an overweight mother.32  She 
originally weighed eighty kilograms and had reached 90.8 kilograms by the 
last prenatal visit.33  The plaintiff was a macrosomic infant with an excessive 
weight at birth.34  Dr. Cheng estimated his weight at week thirty-eight as 
equivalent to that of a forty-week fetus, but failed to give any warning.35  
The defendant responded that in light of current medical knowledge, the care 
provided met the standard of reasonably expected safety and sanitation.  
Although the doctor was found not to be at fault, the Taipei District Court 
held that the hospital was liable under the CPL.36 
The case was appealed to the Taiwan High Court, which affirmed the 
district court’s holding.37  However, the Taiwan Supreme Court did not 
express its position as to the applicability of the CPL.38  The case was 
remanded for further factual findings on whether Dr. Cheng’s procedure 
complied with the reasonably expected safety standard.  Ultimately, the 
parties settled. 
Subsequent to this case, courts’ opinions have varied regarding the 
applicability of the CPL in medical malpractice cases.39  Although this issue 
was first brought to the courts several years ago, it is still unclear whether 
medical care is within the scope of the CPL in Taiwan. 
III. THE BO-LI COURT EXTENDED THE SCOPE OF THE CPL TO MEDICAL 
CARE 
The key question about the scope of the CPL arises from how the 
statutory language of the CPL should be construed.  Particularly, there has 
                                           
31
 See Bo-Li, supra note 23.  The original provision of Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL provides 
that “business operators engaging in the provisions of services shall ensure that services provided by them 
are without danger to safety or sanitation.”  In 2005, the original language was amended to “business 
operators engaging in the design, production or manufacture of goods or in the provisions of services shall 
ensure that goods and services provided by them meet and comply with the contemporary technical and 
professional standards of the reasonably expected safety prior to the sold goods launched into the market, 
or at the time of rendering services.”  See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 7. 
32
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
33
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
34
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
35
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
36
 See Bo-Li, supra note 23.  Judge Hui-Rou Tsai presided over the Bo-Li case in the Taipei District 
Court. 
37
 See the Taiwan High Court 87 Docket No. SHANG 151.  The judicial system in Taiwan 
comprises three levels of courts: district courts, high courts and the Supreme Court.  The Taiwan High 
Court is the intermediate appellate court in the northern part of Taiwan. 
38
 See The Taiwan Supreme Court 90 Docket No. TAI-SHANG 709. 
39
 See infra Part V. 
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been much debate on whether the Bo-Li court’s interpretation of Article 7 of 
the CPL is consistent with the legislative intent and underlying policies. 
A. The Bo-Li Court Adopted a Broad Statutory Interpretation of 
“Services” Under the CPL 
The Bo-Li court stated that “any business or enterprise that provides 
services to consumers, due to its relation with consumers’ safety and 
sanitation, is subject to the CPL regardless of whether the services are 
related to merchandise.”40  Although medical care is not a trade directly 
related to merchandise, it certainly provides services concerning consumers’ 
safety and sanitation.  Therefore under this definition, medical care 
providers are “business operators” under the CPL.  In order to determine 
whether seeking medical care is a form of consumption, the Bo-Li court also 
employed economists’ interpretation to define “consumption.”  It reasoned 
that consumption is “an activity to reach an individual’s life goals.”41  Under 
this broad definition, patients are considered consumers because receiving 
medical care is an act performed in order to fulfill individual needs. 
The legal and medical fields have also expressed different views on 
the interpretation of Article 7 of the CPL.  A legal study argued that the way 
the court interpreted “consumption” was too indefinite.42  It proposed that 
this issue should turn on the examination of the activity’s purpose and the 
legislative intent of the CPL.43  First, the scope of consumption should be 
limited to activities that are for personal, not professional purposes.44  Since 
medical care is private, it should be within the scope of “consumption.”  
Second, because the legislative intent of the CPL is to ameliorate the 
unequal bargaining power between business operators and consumers, 
anyone who is subject to risks related to merchandise or services ought to be 
within the scope of consumer protection.45  This study also explained why 
the CPL is distinct from product liability laws in Western countries.46  
Although it came to the same conclusion as the Bo-Li court, the test 
employed by this study is narrower than the court’s approach.  Still, there 
                                           
40
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
41
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li. 
42
 Chung-Wu Chen, I liao hsing wei yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yung ling yu 
[Medical Care and the Applicability of the CPL to Service Liability], 7 TA’I-WAN PEN T’U FA HSUEH TSA 
CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 36, 47 (Feb. 2000) (Taiwan). 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. at 47-8. 
46
 Id. 
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continues to be disagreement in the legal academy as to whether the scope of 
the CPL should extend to medical care.47   
In the medical profession, the predominant view is that the scope of 
the CPL should not extend to medical care.  Doctors unanimously oppose 
medical personnel being classified as “business operators,” 48 and strongly 
disagree with the notion that patients are consumers.49  The medical field has 
contended that the relationship between doctors and patients should not be 
treated as a business relationship, because seeking medical care is not 
consumption.50  Physicians’ main concerns are the implied risks associated 
with the medical profession.51  While the danger to consumers is predictably 
associated with inherently dangerous goods, the medical risks are generally 
unforeseeable and beyond the doctor’s control.52  Therefore, it is unfair to 
allocate all the risks to medical care providers.53 
Furthermore, unlike Taiwan, most other jurisdictions do not award 
damages to medical malpractice cases under no-fault liability.  Thus, the 
medical field urges that courts should prioritize other applicable laws such as 
the Medical Care Act or the Physicians Act54 before the CPL.  Since 1995, 
Taiwan’s medical care has operated under a national insurance scheme and is 
more analogous to a non-profit service than to a business operation.  
Accordingly, the CPL, which primarily deals with business corporations, 
should not apply to medical care.55 
B. Medical Personnel’s Conduct Is Measured by a “Reasonably 
Expected Safety” Standard Under the No-Fault Liability Scheme 
A second inquiry in the Bo-Li case was whether the medical care 
provided by the defendant complied with the “no danger to safety or 
sanitation” standard set forth in Article 7 of the CPL.  The Enforcement 
Rules define “danger to safety or sanitation” as lacking “the generally and 
                                           
47
 Id. at 40. 
48
 Chung-Hsin Hsu, Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa yu i liao fu wu chih shih yung yu chieh shih 
[Interpretation of the CPL and Its Applicability to Service Liability], 7:3 I SHIH FA HSUEH 49, 49 (Sept. 
1999) (Taiwan). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Fu-Hsien Wang, Ts’ung i liao hsing wei shih yung hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa chih cheng i shih lun i 
liao cheng i wei lai tsou hsiang [Applicability and Interpretation of the CPL], 56:9 FA LING YUEH K'AN 
[LAW MONTHLY] 30, 42  (1999) (Taiwan). 
53
 See Hsu, supra note 48, at 49. 
54
 I shih fa [Physicians Act] (Taiwan) [hereinafter Physicians Act]. 
55
 Tzu-Yu Li, I liao hsing wei wu kuo shih chih yen chiu — chien lun 2004 nien “I liao fa” ti pa shih 
erh t'iao chih hsiu cheng [Study of Medical no-fault liability], 3 CHUNG HUA JEN WEN SHE HUI HSUEH PAO 
62, 64 (2005) (Taiwan). 
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reasonably anticipated safety” standard.56  In 2004, the language in Article 7 
was changed from “no danger to safety or sanitation” to “reasonably 
expected safety standard” and reflected the standard set out in the 
Enforcement Rules.57  If a physician’s conduct fails to satisfy the 
“reasonably expected safety” standard under the CPL and the Enforcement 
Rules, he is liable for the injury caused to the plaintiff regardless of whether 
he is at fault. 
Applying the rule in this case, the Bo-Li court held that the hospital 
was liable because the medical service did not meet the “reasonably 
expected safety” standard.  The court reached this decision despite the fact 
that Dr. Cheng exercised all possible care.  One issue arising from this 
reasoning is whether the no-fault liability scheme is essentially a fault-based 
system adopted by the Bo-Li court only with a higher standard.  In other 
words, the question is, under the no-fault liability system, whether there is a 
difference between negligence and failing to meet the reasonably expected 
safety measure. 
One study suggested that the reasonably expected safety standard is an 
objective determination of “abnormal or unreasonable risks” associated with 
medical care, whereas negligence is a subjective measure of the defendant’s 
conduct.58  Because abnormal or unreasonable risks are unforeseeable, they 
are irrelevant to defendant’s actions.59  Accordingly, no-fault liability should 
apply to injuries caused by this type of risk.  In contrast, a service provider’s 
fault is determined by his conduct, such as whether he breached the duty to 
prevent foreseeable risks.  Therefore a fault-based scheme should be used 
under these circumstances.60 
The same study suggested that no-fault liability should apply to 
“medical accidents,” not “treatment failure.”61  “Medical accidents” are 
unforeseeable injuries outside the scope of medical care.62  These injuries are 
neither side effects nor ineffective medical outcomes.  Under these 
circumstances, it is rational to apply the “reasonably expected safety 
standard” under the no-fault scheme to protect patients from unpredictable 
                                           
56
 See Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 5. 
57
 See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 7. 
58
 Chung-Wu Chen, I liao shih ku yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yun yao chien 
(shang)--t'ai-wan t'ai pei ti fang fa yuen pa shih wu nien tu su tzu ti wu i erh wu hao yu t'ai wan kao teng fa 
yuen pa shih ch'I nien tu shang tzu ti I wu i hao (ma chieh chi nien i yuen chien nan ch'an an chien) p'an 
chueh tsai p'ing shih [Medical Accidents and the Applicability of the CPL, Part I] 17 T'AI-WAN PEN T'U FA 
HSUEH TSA CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 75, 80-102 (Dec. 2000) (Taiwan). 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 102-7. 
62
 Id. 
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risks.63  On the other hand, “treatment failure” refers to the uncertainty 
associated with medical care.64  Because of the variation among patients’ 
symptoms and physical conditions, perfect results are not guaranteed.  It is 
impossible to avoid side effects or negative medical outcomes.  Accordingly, 
no-fault liability should not apply to injuries caused by “treatment failure.”65  
This study concluded that the analysis is consistent with the underlying 
policy of the CPL to protect patients (consumers) in malpractice cases.66 
Nevertheless, in practice it is difficult to differentiate “treatment 
failure” from “medical accidents” and whether the risks are foreseeable or 
reasonable.  Thus, the measurement of physicians’ conduct remains a 
problem when determining the applicability of the CPL in medical 
malpractice settings. 
C. No-Fault Liability Is Subject to the Exception of the Then Technical 
and Professional Standard 
The Enforcement Rules provide a technical defense:  goods or 
services that are up to the current scientific and technical or professional 
standards may be exempt from the CPL.67  In essence, it is similar to the 
state-of-the-art defense under U.S. product liability.  That is, if the defendant 
can prove that at the time the product was manufactured, the state-of-the-art 
did not allow for production of a safer product at a reasonable cost, the 
defendant is not liable for injury caused to the plaintiff.68  The concept of the 
technical defense under the Enforcement Rules originates from the European 
Union Product Liability Directive.69  Article 7 of the Directive provides that 
“[t]he producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he 
proves . . . that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time 
when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered.”70  Accordingly, the technical 
                                           
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
67
 See Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 5. 
68
 See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1319 (1997). 
69
 Chung-Wu Chen, I liao shih ku yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yun yao chien --
t'ai wan t'ai pei ti fang fa yuen pa shih wu nien tu su tzu ti wu i erh wu hao yu t'ai wan kao teng fa yuen pa 
shih ch'I nien tu shang tzu ti I wu i hao (ma chieh chi nien i yuen chien nan ch'an an chien) p'an chueh tsai 
p'ing shih-shang [Medical Accidents and The Applicability of Consumer Protection Law to Service 
Liability, Part II] 18 T'AI-WAN PEN T'U FA HSUEH TSA CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 39, 41-2 (Jan. 2001) 
(Taiwan). 
70
 Council Directive 85/374, art. 7, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EU), available at www.dehp-
facts.com/upload/documents/document42.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) (emphasis added).  
814 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 3 
 
 
defense under the Enforcement Rules refers to undetectable risks based on 
technical or professional standards at the time the service was provided.  
However, the definition of “standards” is unclear, as they are variable 
depending on location and specialization. 
The Bo-Li court employed a strict interpretation of this technical 
defense, reasoning that “the determining factor is not whether a particular 
manufacturer who complies with the typical objective group standard could 
recognize the risks or defects.  Instead, it is whether anyone would know the 
risks in an objective standard.”  In other words, the technical exception 
applies only when no one in the world would recognize the medical risks 
associated with the most advanced technology available.  Under this strict 
construction, the Mackay Memorial Hospital could not raise the technical 
defense, as Tan’s obesity would have been recognized as a possible cause for 
shoulder dystocia.  Consequently, it would be irrelevant whether the 
shoulder dystocia was unpredictable or unpreventable.71 
Compared to Bo-Li, courts in subsequent opinions employed a more 
lenient interpretation with respect to technical defenses.  Even if the court 
held the CPL applicable, defendants have prevailed by raising the technical 
defense in the medical dispute setting.72 
IV. THE BO-LI CASE REFLECTS PROBLEMS WITH THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN 
OF PROOF IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 
The burden to prove negligence in a medical malpractice case is 
highly technical and requires professional expertise.  Similar to the U.S. 
scheme, proof of a medical malpractice claim in Taiwan requires a showing 
of the standard of care, breach of the standard by the defendant, injury, and 
causation.  Unless the burden is shifted to the defendant,73 the plaintiff bears 
the burden to demonstrate defendant’s fault in a medical negligence suit.74  
Under the American tort scheme, plaintiffs are permitted to introduce 
expert testimony of their choice to establish the standard of care.  The 
expert’s role is to help the fact-finder to understand technical subject matters 
outside common knowledge.  In contrast, a Taiwanese plaintiff usually does 
not have the ability to introduce expert testimony in court.  Instead, the court 
                                           
71
 See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li (emphasis added). 
72
 See, e.g., Yueh-Chen Yang v. Hung-Hui Kuan CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taichung Dist. Ct. Dec. 25, 
2003) (91 Docket No. CHUNG-SU 936). 
73
 See, e.g., Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 6 (providing that a defendant has the burden of 
proof if raising the technical defense under the CPL). 
74
 Min shih su sung fa [Code of Civil Procedure] (Taiwan) art. 277 [hereinafter Code of Civil 
Procedure]. 
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orders the MRC to investigate medical disputes and offer advisory expert 
testimony concerning a defendant’s negligence and causation.  Because 
courts usually do not have the knowledge and experience to evaluate a 
physician’s conduct, they typically adopt the MRC’s conclusions in making 
their decisions.75 
The review procedure of the MRC in a medical dispute comprises 
screening, preliminary peer review, and secondary review.76  At the 
screening stage, the clerk of the BMA registers the judicial inquiry of a case 
and checks the sufficiency of information.77  If the MRC decides to take on a 
case, it will assign the file to a medical institution for preliminary peer 
review.  The appointed institution then conducts the review and delivers a 
written opinion within weeks of the MRC’s request.78  At the stage of 
secondary review, the MRC will discuss the preliminary review and render 
opinions.79  Physicians on the MRC will provide further medical opinions, 
while non-physicians can raise concerns about the laws and plaintiffs’ 
interests.80  A final report is submitted to the inquiring organization after the 
MRC members reach a unanimous decision.81 
Although the new structure of the MRC was intended to balance the 
interests of medical personnel and patients, several concerns about its 
objectivity have been raised.  First, the MRC’s review is based solely on the 
documents provided by the inquiring organization.82  Patients are not entitled 
to participate in the MRC meeting during the review process.83  Second, 
patients do not have easy access to medical records, which are often 
incomplete or illegible.84  Third, the identities of parties involved in a suit 
are not concealed, raising a possibility of bias and favoritism.85  Moreover, 
there are accusations of a “conspiracy of silence” within the medical 
profession.86  It is rare that a physician will testify against another in a 
medical malpractice case.  A recent study showed that between August 1, 
1999 and September 30, 2005, the MRC found negligence in only 13.4% of 
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medical malpractice inquiries.87  In addition, the growing number of medical 
malpractice lawsuits increased the judicial inquiries of medical review.  The 
number rose from an average of 198 in 1995 to 465 inquiries in 2003.88  The 
increased inquires also cause delay in the medical review and public 
skepticism as to its quality. 
The Bo-Li case exemplifies the long-standing problem of proving 
negligence in a malpractice case.  The plaintiff in Bo-Li brought a tortious 
claim against the hospital for failing to ensure his safety.  However, based on 
the medical review supplied by the MRC, the court was unable to reach a 
conclusion regarding the defendant’s fault.  Under the U.S. expert system, 
such a case might have found negligence, as Dr. Cheng did not give any 
warning despite a number of risk indications over Tan’s pregnancy.  In fact, 
the academics have questioned whether Dr. Cheng failed to exercise his duty 
of informed consent. 89  As an alternative avenue to compensate the plaintiff, 
the Bo-Li court held that medical personnel should be subject to no-fault 
liability under the CPL.  Accordingly, although the Mackay Memorial 
Hospital was found faultless, it was held liable for Bo-Li Li’s plexus injuries 
resulting from shoulder dystocia. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE CPL TO 
MEDICAL CARE, WHILE THE LEGISLATURE’S ATTITUDE IS UNCLEAR 
A. The Lower Courts Hold Different Views on the Scope of the CPL from 
That of the Bo-Li Court 
Since the Bo-Li case, lower courts have been split on the interpretation 
of Article 7.  For example, in Rui-Liang He v. Taipei Yang-Ming Hospital, 
the Shi-Lin District Court indirectly affirmed that medical care is within the 
scope of the CPL, although the case was dismissed because of the statute of 
limitation.90  However, in Shu-Han Hsu v. Hung-Chih Hsu, another shoulder 
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 TSE-CHENG WU, TS'UNG PING HUAN KUAN TIEN T'AN T'AO YIN CH'I I LIAO CHIU FEN CH'AN SHENG TE 
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selecting 162 cases for study).  
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 Ching-Te Lai, Tui i liao shang hai ch'u li fa ts'ao an te cheng fan mien i chien [Pros and cons of 
Medical Injury Management Proposal], available at http://morpheus.typepad.com/iait/2007/02/post_1.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
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2001) (89 Docket No. SU 1185). 
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dystocia and birth injury case, the Taipei District Court reached a different 
conclusion.91  In contrast with the Bo-Li case, the Shu-Han court emphasized 
that medical care should be exempt from the CPL.92  The court in Shu-Han 
reasoned that seeking medical care is not consumption within the meaning of 
the CPL, as it is neither merchandise nor for the purpose of profit.  As 
medical care is closely associated with public health, it should be regulated 
by health-related laws such as the Medical Act, not the CPL.93 
The court deciding Sheng-Hsiung Huang v. Shu-Hsun Chu rejected 
applying the CPL and ultilized the approach of “teleologische reduktion” 
(teleological or purposive reduction).94  That is, when the literal 
interpretation is not consistent with the legislative intent, the statute must be 
construed restrictively to comply with its purpose.95  Courts adopting this 
theory believe that no-fault liability would drive doctors to practice 
“defensive medicine” and avoid liability rather than benefit patients.96  
Under this theory, although medical care is within the literal interpretation of 
services under the CPL, imposing no-fault liability is inconsistent with the 
legislative purpose to protect the interests of consumers (patients).97  
Similarly, other courts considered the public policy of preventing defensive 
medicine and refused to extend the scope of the CPL.98 
B. The Taiwan Supreme Court Refuses to Extend the Scope of the CPL to 
Medical Care 
Despite the existence of different views among the lower courts, the 
Taiwan Supreme Court was silent on the scope of the CPL for seven years.  
In Chin-Ying Yao Su v. Miao-Li Hospital, Department of Health, a case 
involving a birth injury dispute, the Supreme Court spoke on the issue for 
the first time, and held that “medical care is not within the scope of the 
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 See Shu-Han Hsu v. Hung-Chih Hsu, 2000 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct. Sept. 20, 2000) 
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(87 Docket No. SU 1521). 
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CPL.”99  Although the Court did not give any reasoning for its interpretation, 
the Chin-Ying case delineated the Taiwan Supreme Court’s position on the 
issue of scope.  Last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in 
Sheng-Chan Chien v. Fang-Ping Chen.100  This case was about a vacuum 
extraction that led to permanent brain lesions in a newborn.  The plaintiff 
sued the hospital under the no-fault liability clause in the CPL.  The Taiwan 
Supreme Court refused to apply the CPL, reasoning that the legislative intent 
of the CPL was to impose no-fault liability to deter manufacturers from 
bringing dangerous goods into the market.101  However, current medical 
knowledge is in fact quite limited as to treatment options.102  If no-fault 
liability is imposed on medical care, doctors may undertake procedures 
based on the severity of side effects or give up a more effective but high-risk 
procedure to avoid liability.103  This would delay timely treatments, increase 
unnecessary waste of medical resources, and would not benefit society or 
patients.104  The Court reasoned that defensive medicine obviously runs 
counter the legislative intent of the CPL to protect the interests of 
consumers, and concluded that the CPL should be construed restrictively 
under teleologische reduktion.105  The Taiwan Supreme Court held that 
medical care should be excluded from the scope of the CPL.106 
In Sheng-Chan, the Supreme Court explained why the CPL should not 
apply to medical care at length.107  Like the Sheng-Hsiung court,108 the 
Supreme Court refused to extend the scope based on legislative intent and 
policy concerns of preventing defensive medicine.  Although stare decisis 
does not apply to Taiwan’s civil law, the highest court’s opinion can strongly 
influence a future interpretation of a law by lower courts.109  In fact, the 
Taipei District Court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in a recent medical 
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dispute case.110  However, only the legislature may make the law under the 
civil law system, so the ultimate definition of the CPL’s scope is still a 
legislative issue. 
C. The Legislature’s Stand on the Scope of the CPL Is Unclear 
After Bo-Li was decided, the medical field began campaigning for the 
Legislative Yuan to exclude medical care from the scope of the CPL through 
legislation.111  However, although the Legislative Yuan amended the CPL 
several times, it has been reluctant to codify the scope in the statute or give 
guidance in the Enforcement Rules.112 
The Bo-Li case also prompted academics to discuss the interplay 
between the Medical Care Act and the CPL on the issue of no-fault liability.  
The Medical Care Act was enacted in 1986 for the purposes of promoting 
medical development and improving national health.113  Since the Bo-Li 
case, doctors have advocated for the legislature to clarify the scope of 
medical liability under the Medical Care Act.  In response to physicians’ 
lobbying, Article 82 of the Medical Care Act was added in 2004 to limit 
medical liability to acts that were “deliberate or [committed] by accident.”114  
As the amended Act only stipulates the liability for these specific categories, 
the medical profession contended that no-fault liability under the CPL 
should not apply.  However, this argument’s validity has been questioned.115  
Although the Medical Care Act excludes no-fault liability, it does not 
exclude the applicability of the CPL to medical care.116  Until the scope of 
the CPL is clearly defined in the statute itself, medical care is still within the 
reach of services under Article 7. 
                                           
110
 Hao Hsiung v. Cathy General Hosp., 2006 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (94 Docket No. I 6) (Taipei Dist. 
Ct., Oct. 23, 2006). 
111
 The Legislative Yuan is the legislative body in Taiwan. 
112
 The CPL was last amended on Feb 5, 2005. 
113
 See Medical Care Act, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1. 
114
 See Medical Care Act, supra note 12, at art. 82.  This Comment adopts the official Chinese 
reading of Article 82 of the Medical Care Act, which is different from the official English translation.  The 
official English translation of Article 82 of the Medical Care Act reads as “[t]hose conducting medical 
practices shall pay proper attention to medical care procedure.  Medical care institutions and their medical 
personnel who harm patients in the execution of practice, whether deliberate or by accident, shall be 
responsible for compensation.” 
115
 Shinrou Lin & Hsiu-I Yang, Kao pieh ma chieh chien nan ch'an shih chien?  hsin i liao fa ti 82 tiao 
ti erh hsiang p'ing his [Farewell to the Bo-Li Case? Discussion of Article 82 of the Medical Act], 112 YUEH 
TAN FA HSUEH [TAIWAN JURIST] 24, 24 (Sept. 2004). 
116
 Id. at 25. 
820 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 3 
 
 
VI. IT IS CURRENTLY IMPRACTICAL TO INSTITUTE NO-FAULT MEDICAL 
LIABILITY IN TAIWAN 
Notwithstanding the judicial and legislative treatment of no-fault 
liability for medical malpractice, there remains the question of whether it is 
practical to use the CPL as a medical compensation scheme in Taiwan. 
A. The CPL May Not Account for the Difference between Product 
Liability and Service Liability 
From a comparative law standpoint, the CPL is a rare instance of 
legislation that combines product and service liabilities into one law.117  The 
“reasonably expected safety standard” under the current Article 7 is derived 
from product liability law,118 where it is used to measure defects in a product 
without having to prove the manufacturer’s negligence.  However, the scope 
of the CPL also encompasses service liability.119  A practical concern is that a 
standard used to measure product liability may not apply straightforwardly 
to services.  Because products are tangible, it is easier to measure product 
defects against a reasonableness standard.  By contrast, the conduct of a 
service provider is intangible.  Thus, it is harder to apply this standard and 
draw the line between negligence and the reasonably expected safety 
standard in service liability.120  In addition, the ambiguity of the technical 
defense standard also poses a practical problem for instituting no-fault 
medical liability under the CPL.121 
Another concern arising from this rare legislation is the scarcity of 
legal references and precedents.122  Because most other jurisdictions apply 
separate laws to products and services, there is not much guidance on the 
interpretation of service liability in a case such as Bo-Li.  This presents a 
problem when the judiciary deals with difficult cases such as malpractice 
disputes. 
B. Taiwan’s Social Circumstances Are Not Favorable to Instituting 
Medical No-Fault Liability 
Prior to Bo-Li, Congressman Fu-Hsueng Shen proposed a no-fault 
compensation plan modeled after the Swedish Patient Compensation 
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Scheme, introduced in 1975.123  Unlike the cause-based liability under the 
CPL, Shen’s proposal was a first-party patient injury insurance system.124  
Sweden’s initial insurance scheme was a voluntary contract between a 
consortium of Swedish insurers and the county councils, which are 
responsible for the public health.  It was superior in compensation and cost, 
easy to operate, and acceptable to both physicians and patients.  In 1997, it 
became mandatory for every health care provider in Sweden to compensate 
for injuries from medical procedures on a no-fault basis.125 
Sweden is one of the few countries with a successful no-fault medical 
liability system.  Its success is largely due to Sweden’s public health system, 
part of the generous welfare system unique to Northern European 
countries.126  In Sweden, the state funds all hospitals; only five percent of 
physicians are not employees of the state.127  As a result, financial 
responsibility is allocated among the national government, county councils, 
and municipalities.128  In addition, medical injuries are compensated by other 
social insurance systems such as public insurance, workers’ compensation, 
security insurance, and no-fault medical drug insurance.129 
Compared to Sweden, Taiwan does not have an especially favorable 
welfare system and likewise lacks a long tradition of insurance networks.130  
In fact, Shen’s suggestion and a similar proposed “Medical Injury 
Management Law” were severely questioned as to practicability.131  Unlike 
the patient compensation scheme in Sweden, the NHIP covers illness, injury, 
and child delivery, but not medical accidents.132  Moreover, very few 
insurance companies offer first-party medical insurance plans to patients, as 
the use of these insurance policies is traditionally viewed as bad luck by 
Taiwanese people.133  Unlike the Swedish system, no-fault liability under the 
CPL is purely based on cause.134  Without the support of superior social 
welfare systems to compensate medical injuries, it is even less feasible to 
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require medical care providers to bear financial responsibilities regardless of 
fault.  Because the required social circumstances are missing, it is currently 
impractical to apply cause-based or insurance-based no-fault medical 
liability in Taiwan. 
C. No-Fault Liability Would Encourage Defensive Medicine 
Defensive medicine is performed to avert the possibility of 
malpractice lawsuits.135  It refers to the phenomenon where doctors take 
actions that reduce risk of liability rather than the risk of error.  In the United 
States, defensive medicine is an emerging problem in the medical profession 
because of concerns over the threat of lawsuits and large damage awards.136  
A research study found that three-fourths of medical specialists agreed that 
every patient is viewed as a potential malpractice lawsuit because of 
concerns over malpractice liability.137  In addition, 91% of specialists 
expressed the opinion that the medical liability system limits doctors’ ability 
to provide the highest quality care.138  In an effort to ameliorate the burden 
of medical professionals, several tort reform and alternative dispute 
resolution initiatives have attempted to cope with medical liability in the 
U.S.139 
Similar to the U.S., the practice of defensive medicine in Taiwan is 
increasingly becoming an issue.  Since the institution of NHIP, relatively low 
premium and comprehensive benefits have attracted more patients to seek 
medical care.  In turn, there are more medical malpractice lawsuits filed in 
courts.  Statistics show that in Taiwan, increased disputes also drive medical 
personnel to order unnecessary tests or avoid high-risk procedures 
altogether.140  These facts seem to counter the Bo-Li court’s reasoning that 
the practice of defensive medicine can be attributed to physicians’ 
irresponsible attitudes.141  It is foreseeable that without a well-structured 
compensation scheme, no-fault liability would boost the culture of defensive 
medicine among physicians seeking to avoid being sued.  In fact, defensive 
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medicine is a major concern raised by the Taiwan courts when they refuse to 
apply no-fault medical liability.142 
Defensive medicine is the least desirable outcome in modern medicine 
due to the rise of litigation.  Medical judgment is jeopardized, at least to 
some extent, by a desire to avoid risk of liability.143  Because defensive 
medicine would inevitably expose patients to unnecessary risks, it is 
contrary to the underlying policy of the CPL to benefit patients.  
Accordingly, until Taiwan has the social capacity to compensate patients on 
a no-fault basis, it is against public policy to institute no-fault medical 
liability in Taiwan. 
VII. TAIWAN SHOULD WORK ON EXISTING PROBLEMS UNDER THE CURRENT 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCHEME 
Instead of a sudden jump to a no-fault scheme, this Comment 
proposes that Taiwan should aim to resolve existing problems under the 
traditional negligence-based system. 
A. Taiwan Should Strive to Reform the Malpractice Litigation Process 
The foremost issue in Taiwan’s medical malpractice scheme is the 
difficulty of proving fault in the current malpractice litigation process.  It is 
partly due to prejudice in the current MRC medical review in favor of the 
defendant.  Because plaintiffs cannot introduce expert testimony at trial, they 
are disadvantaged in medical malpractice litigation.  This Comment 
proposes that Taiwan restructure the litigation process to reduce a plaintiff’s 
burden of proving negligence.  For example, the judiciary should frame 
inquiries to the MRC with more specificity, and evaluate the review more 
critically.144  Courts should also require hospitals to conceal the identities of 
involved parties to prevent potential prejudice.145 
Further, Taiwan should liberalize the expert review system.  The 
judiciary could follow common law jurisdictions and allow both parties to 
present expert testimony at trial.  Because patients generally do not have the 
requisite medical training, allowing expert testimony could alleviate the 
potential favoritism of medical review.  Courts could also adopt the 
exception of common knowledge to allow a plaintiff to prove negligence 
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without expert testimony,146 or expand the scope of res ipsa loquitur in cases 
involving gross or obvious negligence.147  These approaches do not require 
MRC review, and could also serve as a solution to the current backlog 
problem with increasing judicial inquiries at the MRC.  Finally, Taiwan 
should emphasize continuing legal education for lawyers and judges in 
medical malpractice, and place an emphasis on multi-disciplinary education 
in the study of law and medicine.148  Although this will not replace the need 
for experts, this institutional change would certainly promote a better 
understanding of experts’ opinions.149 
B. The Medical Field Should Emphasize the Duty of Informed Consent 
and Medical Malpractice Insurance 
The informed consent doctrine is a relatively new concept in Taiwan’s 
legal field.150  It did not receive recognition until the late 1990s.  After the 
Bo-Li case, this doctrine was invoked by academics in the discussion of 
whether Dr. Cheng failed to exercise his duty of informed consent.151  One 
study argues that the Bo-Li court’s refusal to allow the defendant’s technical 
defense implied that the defendant was in fact negligent.152  However, the 
Bo-Li court was unable to find the defendant at fault based on the medical 
review supplied by the MRC.  Had the doctor informed the patients about 
the risks of shoulder dystocia and allowed Ms. Tan to choose her birth 
method, this case might not have been litigated. 
For a long time, physicians were viewed as paternal figures with 
supreme authority in Taiwan.153  Patients were in awe of doctors and 
generally accepted a doctor’s decision.154  With the increase of medical 
malpractice, patients are realizing the importance of making informed 
decisions throughout the treatment process.  In response to the change in 
health care, the legislature codified the duty of informed consent in the 
amended Physicians Act.155  However, doctors do not seem to have kept up 
with the evolving patient-doctor relationship and are sometimes reluctant to 
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address patients’ concerns or questions.156  This Comment proposes that the 
medical field should emphasize the duty of informed consent through 
schooling and continuing education.  Medical personnel should realize that 
consent is becoming a fundamental part of the patient-doctor relationship; 
decision-making is no longer a unilateral process in medical care. 
In addition, Taiwan should promote widespread medical malpractice 
insurance.  Unlike the prevalence of malpractice insurance in the U.S., 
statistics show that only five percent of physicians currently have medical 
liability insurance.157  One reason for the low participation rate is physicians’ 
fear of patients’ skepticism and reputation damage.  Another reason is the 
lack of feasible insurance plans.  Most insurance plans require complex 
procedures such as a judicial order before being able to compensate an 
injured patient.158  Because these insurance plans do not meet the 
expectations and demands of the insured, medical insurance is unpopular 
among medical personnel in Taiwan.159 
This Comment proposes that Taiwan encourage doctors to participate 
in medical malpractice insurance.  The government should take steps to 
assure the public that a physician’s skill level has nothing to do with the 
need for malpractice insurance.  Instead, having malpractice insurace 
indicates a doctor’s degree of responsibility and ability to compensate a 
patient if an injury does occur.  This Comment also proposes that the Taiwan 
government recommend that insurance companies institute compensation 
schemes that do not require doctors to be involved.  Injured patients can 
request compensation directly from the insurance company, and speed up the 
compensation process.  Further, to incentivize medical personnel to 
participate in medical liability insurance, the judiciary should grant 
expedited hearings to insured physicians so that they can reach a judicial 
decision sooner than with the uninsured.  With the support of malpractice 
insurance, doctors are less likely to practice defensive medicine.  Aggrieved 
patients are more likely to be compensated. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Bo-Li case triggered a debate about no-fault medical liability in 
Taiwan.  The Bo-Li court extended the scope of the CPL to medical care and 
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held that the CPL should apply in medical malpractice.  After seven years, 
the Taiwan Supreme Court rejected Bo-Li, predicting that no-fault liability 
would encourage defensive medicine.  However, the legislature’s stand is 
still unclear.  The Bo-Li case illustrates the obstacles plaintiffs face when 
trying to prove a doctor’s negligence.  However, comparison to other 
systems reveals that a no-fault medical liability requires a superior social 
welfare system and insurance network.  Therefore, it is currently impractical 
in Taiwan.  This Comment proposes that instead of a sudden switch to no-
fault liability, Taiwan should strive to solve existing problems under the 
traditional scheme by improving the litigation process, implementing the 
doctrine of informed consent, and encouraging the participation of medical 
malpractice insurance. 
IX. TRANSLATION OF BO-LI LI V. MACKAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
The Taiwan Taipei District Court Civil Judgment 85 Docket No. SU 
5125 
[Case Holding:] 
Regarding the damage compensation between the parties, the court’s 
judgment is as follows:  the defendant shall pay the plaintiff one million NT 
dollars from December 7, 1996 until the balance is paid off.  The interest is 
calculated at the annual rate of five percent.  The defendant shall be 
responsible for the litigation cost. 
Reasoning: 
Third,160 the CPL merely defines “merchandise” in the statutory 
language but does not give any definition or restriction for “service.”  Any 
business or enterprise that provides services to consumers, due to its relation 
with consumers’ safety and sanitation, is subject to the CPL regardless of 
whether the services are related to merchandise.  Furthermore, consumption 
is an activity to reach an individual’s life goals.  Any activity based on 
living, seeking a convenient or comfortable life is within the scope of 
consumption; any activity calculated to satisfy an individual’s desire for 
edibles or food, clothing, accommodation, transportation, education, or 
entertainment is consumption.  In short, all activities related to human life 
are within the scope of consumption (with reference to Understanding the 
Consumer Protection Law, page 55 and Information on Questions and 
Answers of the Consumer Protection Law, page 11 by Sen-Lin Chan, Chen-
Yu Feng and Ming-Chu Lin).  From the perspective of medical care 
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providers, medical care is neither related to merchandise nor for the purpose 
of profit.  However, it is highly relevant to consumers’ safety or sanitation.  
From the perspective of medical care receivers, medical care is an activity 
based on essential needs and a desire to live.  It is evident that patients 
receive medical care for reason of consumption (with reference to Article 2, 
Paragraph 1 of the CPL161).  Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL provides that 
“business operators engaging in the provisions of services shall ensure that 
services provided by them are without danger to safety or sanitation.”  The 
CPL shows that the nature of services defined in the statute is based on the 
presumption that consumers may be subject to the risks of public health or 
safety dangers from the services provided.  Medical care is within the scope 
of professional and technical services, not related to merchandise or business 
transactions.  Also, there are medical uncertainties and risks involved in the 
diagnosis or treatment process and no assurance that the process will be 
“free of danger to safety or sanitation.”  Medical care is closely related to 
public life, health, and safety.  The legislative purpose [of the CPL] is to 
protect consumer interests and promote consumer safety, as well as raise the 
quality of life (with reference to Article 1 of the CPL).  Therefore, medical 
care shall be regulated under the CPL.  Moreover, there are uncertainties and 
risks associated with every profession.  It is without merit that the CPL does 
not apply to medical services because of the risks involved.  By contrast, 
health care providers should bear a higher degree of liability for the 
particular uncertainties and risks concerned.  Further, the CPL does not 
impose unlimited no-fault liability to service providers.  There is a clear 
definition of “danger to safety or sanitation” stated in Article 5 of the 
Enforcement Rules, which limits the scope of no-fault liability under the 
CPL.  Thus, no-fault liability would not apply to unmanageable variables in 
the treatment process, which are excluded from the scope of no-fault liability 
under the definition of the Enforcement Rules.  If a physician refuses to see 
high-risk patients, stops trying uncertain surgeries to avoid no-fault liability, 
or increases the number of unnecessary check-ups, tests, treatments or 
surgeries, and wastes medical resources or increases health care costs, this 
would be the physician’s personal attitude to refuse responsibility.  As 
medical care is tightly associated with patients’ life and health, how could a 
doctor advance his personal interests at the expense of patients’ rights?  In 
conclusion, medical services are within the scope of the CPL. 
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Fourth, Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL expressly provides that the 
business operator shall ensure that the service they provide is free of “danger 
to safety or sanitation.”  The “danger to safety or sanitation” refers to the 
services that do not comply with reasonably expected safety standards or 
meet professional or technical standards under Article 5 of the Enforcement 
Rules.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided services with danger 
to safety or sanitation, which caused plaintiff’s shoulder dystocia.  The 
plaintiff requested damages, which were disavowed by the defendant.  The 
defendant argued that the services provided satisfy the standards of 
reasonably expected safety and are in accord with current medical 
knowledge, without any health or safety risks.  Thus, there is no liability 
under the law.  Under the no-fault liability rule of the CPL, the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the services comply with the 
standards of current technology or profession (with reference to Article 6 of 
the Enforcement Rules). 
But the court finds: 
First, Article 7 of the CPL stipulates a no-fault liability scheme with a 
clear legislative intent.  Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL states that if 
business operators can prove that they are not guilty of negligence, the court 
may reduce their liability for damages, provided that the assessment does not 
affect the establishment of the liability claim.  Under Article 5, Paragraph 1 
of the Enforcement Rules, the interpretation should not be based on whether 
the conduct of the relevant business operator is culpable.  Otherwise, the rule 
merely converts the existing product liability scheme under the CPL to an 
assumed liability system, and would not reach the original legislative intent 
to allocate the risks under a no-fault liability system.  Accordingly, the 
determining factor is not whether a particular manufacturer who complies 
with the typical objective group standard could recognize the risks or 
defects.  Instead, it is whether anyone would know the risks in an objective 
standard.  Therefore, the burden to prove they were not at fault is waived 
only upon a situation where no one could recognize the risks or defects.  
Such interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent of no-fault 
liability.  According to Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL, the court may 
reduce liability for damages if business operators can prove no-fault.  
Therefore [the law] does not impose an unreasonable burden on the business 
operators.  The defense of risk liability in development and technology 
standards applies to matters related to unknown risks (with reference to 
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volume 1, pages 135 to 147 of “General Discussion of Risk Liability in 
Development” by Ming-Yang Huang).162 
Third, Chang-Lan Tan received her first ultrasound examination on 
September 22, 1994.  Cheng-Chieh Cheng corrected the estimation of Ms. 
Tan’s full-term pregnancy from the originally assessed thirty-two weeks to 
twenty-nine weeks, and re-assessed the estimated date for delivery to be 
December 10, 1994.  Tan received a second ultrasound examination on 
November 21, 1994 when she was in her 38th week of pregnancy.  Cheng 
estimated the fetal weight to be 3,500 grams, which is equivalent to the 
weight of a 40-week fetus.  Tan originally weighed 80 kilograms and gained 
up to 90.8 kilograms on December 1, 1994 at the last prenatal check-up; she 
was considered an overweight mother.  The plaintiff weighed 4,198 grams at 
birth and was considered a macrosomic infant.  Maternal overweight, fetal 
macrosomia and the use of midpelvic vacuum extraction are three risk 
factors for shoulder dystocia.  These facts were supported by the report of 
Medical Review Committee on December 14, 1995 and the testimony of 
Cheng (see the argument record on November 5, 1997).  Neither party 
disputes the facts, so they are considered valid.  Cheng estimated the fetal 
weight at week 38 as equivalent to that of a 40-week-old fetus at the second 
prenatal check-up.  Tan’s overweight was also evident at the last prenatal 
visit.  Based on the facts stated above, it was objectively foreseeable that 
there was a risk of shoulder dystocia.  Although there is an allowable error 
rate of 15% with ultrasonography, given that the estimated birth weight is 
3,500 grams, the range of plaintiff’s estimated birth weight was 3,230 grams 
to 4,370 grams.  Why did Cheng state that the plaintiff was 3,230 grams 
rather than 4,370 grams of weight?  The defendant and Cheng repeatedly 
stressed that the data provided by the NTU Hospital is the average growth 
weight.  However, knowing that the data was an average value, objectively 
speaking, there is a possibility that the plaintiff weighed more than the 
average.  Absent any reliable method of prenatal diagnosis of shoulder 
dystocia, the defendant should not have neglected the fact that the plaintiff’s 
estimated weight was higher than the average at the second prenatal 
checkup. 
Fourth, in summary, according to prenatal check-up data, objectively 
speaking, the incidence of shoulder dystocia in this case is neither a situation 
where “no one could have recognized the risks,” nor a situation where the 
risk is unknown and no one is able to be aware of it.  Therefore, the 
defendant is not entitled to use the defense of technology standards in the 
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present case.  Furthermore, the business operator who failed to ensure that 
the services provided were free of danger to safety or sanitation and thus 
injured the consumers is jointly liable for damages.  However, the court may 
reduce the liability for damages if the business operator can demonstrate that 
he was not at fault.  This is set forth in Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL. 
The court finds: 
First, the defendant failed to correctly predict the shoulder dystocia 
and provided services with danger to safety or sanitation, causing permanent 
injuries and dysfunctions to the plaintiff’s right forearm.  As mentioned 
previously, the plaintiff has the legal basis to request damages under the law 
stated above.  The defendant argued that the cause of the plaintiff’s plexus 
injury is unclear in the present case.  Shoulder dystocia treated with the 
McRoberts maneuver may cause brachial plexus injuries in newborns.  In 
addition, the incidence of brachial plexus injuries associated with shoulder 
dystocia is 15.2%.  These facts are stated in the report of the Medical 
Review Committee, Department of Health, the Executive Yuan on December 
14, 1995, and are attached to page 55 of the criminal case file.  The plaintiff 
had his first check-up at Chang Gung Memorial Hospital on December 12, 
1994 and was diagnosed as having plexus sprain and palsy in the right 
forearm.  The medical condition is generally caused by fetal overweight 
(overweight is commonly defined as over 4,000 grams.  The plaintiff was 
4,198 grams at birth) or by broad scapula.  The plaintiff had both conditions, 
which was stated in the report of 84 Docket No. Chang Gung Yuan Fa 0116 
(May 5, 1995) from Chang Gung Memorial Hospital attached to page 52 of 
the criminal case file.  The facts that the plaintiff had shoulder dystocia and 
that Cheng used the McRoberts maneuver and performed a midpelvic 
vacuum extraction are described above.  Accordingly, there is a clear causal 
relationship between the shoulder dystocia and the plexus sprain.  The court 
cannot accept the defendant’s argument that the cause of plaintiff’s injury 
was unclear. 
Second, the trial court asked Chang Gung Memorial Hospital in the 
criminal file:  what is the cause of the plaintiff’s injury?  The Hospital 
replied:  “Bo-Li Li had his first visit to our hospital on December 12, 1994.  
He was diagnosed as having plexus sprain and palsy in the right forearm.  
The medical condition is generally caused by fetal overweight (overweight 
is commonly defined as over 4,000 grams.  The plaintiff was 4,198 grams at 
birth) or by broad shoulders.  The plaintiff had both conditions.”  [The facts 
were] stated in the report of 84 Docket No. Chang Gung Yuan Fa 0116 (May 
5, 1995) from Chang Gung Memorial Hospital attached to page 52 of the 
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case file.  The court then inquired to the NTU Hospital whether it was 
possible to discover the condition of fetal overweight or broad shoulders at 
the prenatal check-up, how a gynecologist should handle the situation upon 
discovering the facts over the course of pregnancy, and how a doctor should 
deal with the situation upon discovering the facts at labor. 
The NTU Hospital responded:   
First, the current evaluation of fetal size depends on the 
symphyseal-fundal height and the abdominal circumference.  
Ultrasonography is more accurate in predicting fetal weight.  
However, there is an associated error rate of 15%.  Second, if 
there is a possibility of fetal overweight (in general, more than 
4,000 grams), [the physician has to] assess the maternal pelvis 
size.  If the assessment of the maternal pelvis size is not 
commensurate with the fetal head size, a Caesarean section is 
recommended.  Third, sometimes shoulder dystocia is 
unpredictable in obstetrics.  Upon discovering the medical 
condition stated above, the doctor could apply the McRoberts 
or the Woods maneuver to facilitate with childbirth.  This 
statement is supported by the report 84 Docket No. Hsiao Fu I 
Mi 8496 (June 15, 1995) from the NTU Hospital attached to 
page 59 of the criminal case file.  The report of the Medical 
Review Committee, Department of Health, Executive Yuan 
provides that:  (A) Shoulder dystocia is an emergency situation 
where the fetal head has been delivered but the shoulders 
cannot be delivered naturally or with a steady labor induction.  
Prenatal factors of shoulder dystocia [are described below.  
First,] maternal obesity.  According to the report by Johnson 
and other [medical experts] in 1987, the incidence of shoulder 
dystocia in newborns from mothers weighing above 250 pounds 
is 5.1%.  The incidence in newborns from mothers weighing 
below 200 pounds is 0.1%.  [The second prenatal factor is] fetal 
macrosomia.  In 1985, Spellacy etc. reported that the incidence 
of shoulder dystocia is 8.2% in newborns weighing between 
2,500 and 3,500 grams from mothers weighing above 90 
kilograms; 33% in newborns weighing between 4,500 and 
5,000 grams; and 50% in newborns weighing above 5,000 
grams.  [The third prenatal factor is] maternal diabetes.  As the 
chance of fetal macrosomia increases with maternal diabetes, 
the incidence of brachial plexus injury associated with shoulder 
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dystocia is 15.2% in case of maternal diabetes.  (B) Factors 
causing shoulder dystocia at labor [are described below.  First,] 
prolonged labor.  In 1985, Acker etc. reported that among 
newborns weighing above 4,000 grams, the incidence of 
shoulder dystocia increases if there is a prolonged labor.  [The 
second factor is] use of oxytocin.  Excessive labor induction 
and fetal macrosomia would increase the use of oxytocin.  
These factors combined would cause shoulder dystocia.  [The 
third factor is] use of midpelvic forceps and vacuum extraction.  
Fetal macrosomia would increase the use of forcep delivery and 
vacuum extraction.  The rate of injury is high if shoulder 
dystocia is not properly dealt with.  According to Bendetti and 
Gabbe’s report in 1978, out of nineteen shoulder dystocia cases, 
there were five incidents of clavicle or forearm fractures, three 
incidents of brachial plexus palsy and one incident of abnormal 
neurological exam result.  Literature also reported incidents of 
death caused by serious hypoxia.  (C) Shoulder dystocia is 
considered to be an unpredictable and totally unpreventable 
emergency in current medical practice.  The American Society 
of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) in 1991 recommended 
the approach of episiotomy, adequate anesthesia, and 
suprapubic pressure with downward traction on the fetal head.  
The approach of the McRoberts maneuver (the position of 
raising the legs up and pushing them back against the 
abdomen), Woods Corkscrew maneuver (rotation of the anterior 
shoulder 180 degrees in a progressive manner), or prioritizing 
posterior arm delivery may cause fetal brachial plexus injuries.  
The last resort is to push the fetal head back into the vagina and 
use Caesarean section, perform clavicle fracture or 
symphysiotomy.  This method would cause most serious fetal 
injuries.  Therefore the adoption of Caesarean section after 
shoulder dystocia has occurred is not an ideal delivery method.  
(D) The plaintiff’s mother weighed 90.8 kilograms and was 
considered overweight.  The newborn weighed 4,198 grams and 
was considered a macrosomic infant.  Maternal overweight, 
fetal macrosomia, and the use of midpelvic vacuum extraction 
are the risk factors of shoulder dystocia.163  In the instant case, 
the doctor performed procedures that conform to the current 
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medical practice.  In terms of preventive measures at prenatal 
check-ups, fetal macrosomia is assessed by the symphyseal-
fundal height or by the more accurate ultrasonogaphy.  
According to the medical record, Tan’s symphyseal-fundal 
height was 34 centimeters, which is within the safety range.  
The error rate with ultrasound assessments of fetal weight is 
15% or more if the fetal head has been fixed.  Thus, the 
defendant was not at fault for failing to predict the plaintiff’s 
weight.  Based on the records of Tan and the prenatal check-
ups, it was reasonable to choose vaginal birth.  (E) The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant’s doctor adopted the inappropriate 
birth method, which may be referred to as the first approach in 
the third paragraph.  This approach is used to deal with shoulder 
dystocia and thus is not improper. 
A Medical Review Committee’s report, Department of Health Docket No. I 
84072466 on January 12, 1996 supports this conclusion.  A witness—Dr. 
Fang-I Hong—present at the plaintiff’s birth, testified:   
[W]hen we discovered the shoulder dystocia, we raised Tan’s 
legs and had the assistant apply suprapubic pressure to help 
with the plaintiff’s birth.  We helped Tan raise her legs and push 
them back.  We were obligated to perform these procedures.  
We have the medical record with notes written by the interns, 
residents, the attending physicians, and myself.   
According to the rule of negligence, the actor is at fault if he fails to exercise 
duty of care under the circumstances, though not intentional; or if he has 
foreseen the facts that would constitute crimes, but believed that the facts 
would not occur.  The evidence provided by Chang Gung Memorial 
Hospital, the NTU Hospital, the Medical Review Committee and Dr. Hong’s 
testimony does not prove whether Cheng failed to exercise the duty of care 
over the course of Tan’s pregnancy, during her labor or upon discovering 
shoulder dystocia, or had foreseen the facts that would constitute crimes, but 
believed that the facts would not occur.  The court found that Cheng was not 
at fault.  According to the criminal files from the Taiwan Taipei District 
Court 84 Docket No. TZU 427 and the Taiwan High Court 85 Docket No. 
SHANG-I 2132, Cheng is not found guilty for occupational negligence.164  
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Cheng is the agent of the defendant which provided medical services to the 
plaintiff.  As Cheng was not at fault, under Article 224 of the Civil Code,165 
the defendant should likewise be found not at fault.  Considering the 
business operator’s risk and the plaintiff’s injuries, the court reduces one-
tenth of the original damage award under Article 7 of the CPL.166 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the plaintiff has demonstrated 
reasons in his claims.  The judgment is entered as in this opinion according 
to Article 78 of the Code of Civil Procedure.167 
The Civil Sixth Division Presiding Judge:  Hui-Rou Tsai 
January 2, 1998 
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